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Financial sector development in Central and Eastern Europe has proved to be a very
dramatic process characterized by some well trumpeted success stories but even more
so by many unexpected collapses of seemingly decent institutions and some systemic
meltdown  as  well.  The  overall  record  of  transition  in  the  area  of  financial  sector
development is much less impressive than achievements in macroeconomic stabilization,
economic liberalization and privatization of formerly state owned enterprises. There are
several reasons for this. Among others I would highlight the specific complexities of the
financial business and the intense political as well as emotional sensitiveness attached to
any major move in this area. Influential stakeholders such as politicians, government
officials, business and media people tend to overestimate the real value of particular
institutions  and  at  the  same  time  overemphasize  their  importance  to  the  national
economy. In the absence of strong external and internal governance structures managers
and  at  times  also  owners  of  banks,  brokerages  and  insurance  companies  abuse  this
situation to increase their own influence and perceived importance. The story and history
of financial sector development in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the
first  decade  of  transition,  therefore,  has  been  an  uphill  struggle  to  restore  reliable
channels and prudent practices of financial intermediation – to create a new culture of
trust and confidence against all odds of a dire legacy sometimes characterized by crime
and corruption, cronyism and collusion. 
Key words: financial sector, transition Central and Eastern Europe, banking, corporate
governance.
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It is of course of crucial importance that financial intermediation be reestablished in a
credible  way  since  there  is  no  economic  growth  without  channeling  effectively  and
efficiently the financial savings of the enterprise and household sectors into investment.
This is precisely what is lacking in the transition world after the devastating experience of
communism where reallocation of funds was carried out by orders rather than business
decisions based on calculated risk taking. This has clearly created a different culture and
tradition, one, which did not require the involvement of trust. To change this culture and
tradition, back again, to a market orientated one, takes a long time even if the political
class understands what it takes to recreate this trust and behaves accordingly. But the first
decade of transition shows that the constituting elements of this trust have not been fully
understood and even less so promoted in practice. In most countries there has been
some abuse of the incipient public trust and in some countries – notably Russia – public
trust  has  been  systematically  destroyed  by  consecutive  abusive  degradation  of  the
financial system. In Russia, for example, those who put their money into licensed banks
may have lost it at least twice; first, when hyperinflation in the first half of the 90s wiped
out most savings and second, when the banking sector collapsed in August, 1998. Those
who kept their savings in foreign currency either under the mattress or abroad still have
it. (This means that capital flight is not only a phenomenon reflecting illegal and massive
exportation of funds by some wealthy businessmen and a few criminals but it is a well
established everyday practice even for small people reinforced by hard ways of learning.)
2. Initial Conditions
Some countries started to reform their financial system – first and foremost banking
–  even  before  the  political  changes.  Hungary  and  Poland  had  established  a  two-tier
banking structure as early as in 1987 and 1988, respectively. Yugoslavia, having always had
formally a two-tier arrangement throughout the socialist period, started to liberalize
banking regulation gradually in the second half of the 80s. Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Bulgaria and member states of the Soviet Union were much less fortunate; financial
sector reform could start only after the rather tumultuous political events and under the
auspices of the first democratic governments. It is interesting to note, however, that in all
countries  regulation  for  the  establishment  and  operation  of  banks  and  other
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substantial initiatives leading to rapid growth in the number and size of these institutions.
The  good  news  was  that  –  apart  from  initially  restricting  banks'  ability  to  collect
household deposits and/or engage in foreign exchange related transactions – there were
no significant administrative restrictions in attracting clients, setting fees and interest
rates. Competition was not restricted by administrative limitations on client range, lines
of business and product pricing. The bad news was that prudential regulation did not exist
either, minimum capital standards, liquidity ratios, the concept of solvency and capital
adequacy, requirements for asset classification and provisioning, adequate tax rules, etc.
were all missing at the beginning of transition. This created a somewhat "wild east" type
of environment for liberal capitalism where clients and managers of still state owned
financial institutions as well as owners and managers of newly established private ones
could use and sometimes abuse many of the legal and regulatory loopholes for their own
personal advantage and at the expense of depositors, creditors and ultimately that of
taxpayers as well. 
3. Common Features in 2000
After ten years of transition the financial sector in Central and Eastern Europe is
characterized by:
• Low level of financial intermediation (5–40% of GDP only),
• Relatively poor asset quality and serious undercapitalization,
• Still quite narrow range of services, especially in non-banking,
• Largely immature governance structures, external and internal,
• Increasingly sophisticated legal and regulatory framework,
• Shallow implementation and enforcement capacity.
Compared to either the developed industrialized countries or even some of the fast
growing Asian or Latin American ones financial intermediation in Central and Eastern
Europe is still very shallow. Not only the level of savings channeled through the banking
and insurance systems lags behind mature economies but even more so the amount of
funds directly injected into the real sector in form of loans, corporate bonds, secondary
share issues, etc. seems to be well below comparative standards and genuine demand.
Even the most advanced Central European economies – Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic – show a large deficit in corporate lending; the outstanding amount of loans to
the real economy do not exceed 40% of GDP . This marked shortfall is the direct result
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some years followed by a credit crunch and extreme risk aversion after the collapse of
some banks and brokerages and the tightening of both monetary policy and prudential
rules applicable to asset classification, valuation of collateral, provisioning, etc. While the
expansion in the first period was clearly assisted by directed and insider lending promoted
by  influential  members  of  parliaments,  government  officials  and  well  connected
businessmen the backlash to this lavish and sometimes imprudent behavior has resulted
in  starving  of  even  the  most  creditworthy  and  viable  ventures.  Many  banks  in  the
transition world continue to act like brokerages in money and capital markets by trying
to link their business partners directly and offering them fee generating services rather
than taking any risk in their own balance sheets by properly intermediating available
funds.
Consecutive attempts to clean up the mess and improve the quality of assets by
government  intervention  have  also  proved  to  be  a  double-edged  sword.  While
rehabilitation of the largest state-owned banks (SOBs) was clearly inevitable given the
sizeable  amount  of  inherited  bad  loans,  state  orchestrated  programs  of  bank
recapitalization  and  restructuring  were  too  generous,  too  broad,  too  many  and  too
costly. Managers of SOBs were inclined to understate the true size of their losses before
it was too late and then rushed to overstate it once a program of rehabilitation had been
announced. Since it was very difficult to distinguish between bad assets truly inherited
from the past and generated after the political changes and it was almost impossible to
establish who was responsible for the sharp deterioration of the loan portfolio in light of
the collapse of a good number of corporate clients, governments had no choice but to
admit defeat and proceed with pumping fiscal funds into ailing flagships of the banking
sector. This was not a good excuse, however, for the lack of serious efforts to define and
enforce  an  adequate  set  of  time  bound,  quantifiable  and  monitorable  performance
criteria  against  which  the  achievements  of  old/new  management  should  have  been
evaluated. For this reason and also for the rather loose design of other aspects of the
rehabilitation  plans  coupled  with  serious  flaws  in  understanding  and  realizing  the
magnitude of implicit losses in case of individual banks quite a few governments were
falling into the trap of being forced to repeat bank and insurance consolidation, thus
spending  a  disproportionately  large  amount  of  fiscal  resources  on  an  economically
unavoidable but politically very painful process. Even Hungary, which is considered to
have achieved the best results in financial sector development by now, spent more than
10% of its GDP in more than three rounds of banking sector rehabilitation. In Romania,
the flagship bank Bancorex, the former foreign trade bank had been recapitalized five
times before the government finally decided to liquidate it. In other countries – most
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order to avoid a systemic collapse. But in countries where private commercial banks had
not played any significant role in collecting household deposits and channeling them to the
real  sector  even  a  systemic  collapse  did  not  necessarily  trigger  any  meaningful
governmental action for banking sector rehabilitation. Russia is obviously the best known
example for this quite rational inaction. 
"Banks have much money but all that belongs to other people"
There is terrible confusion about the nature and role of banking business in the
transition world. People tend to have rather distorted views about the essence of banking
especially if they make judgements while having only very superficial understanding of
what financial intermediation is all about. In the early period of the evolution of banking
it was quite common and publicly accepted to demand that banks should pay high interest
on deposits, charge low interest on loans and still remain profitable in order to maximize
dividends after corporatization. Managing risks and liquidity in a prudent manner while
keeping growth at check and optimize the costs for gaining maximum productivity were
concepts  largely  unheard  of  or  clearly  misunderstood.  Private  businessmen,  local
governments, even some churches wanted to establish their own banks in order to
attract  other  people's  money  to  finance  their  own  particular  businesses  and  related
activities. In name of promoting the establishment, expansion and proliferation of new
firms, banks, private and public alike, were expected to accumulate a largely illiquid
investment portfolio of corporate equity. SOBs were openly criticized by government
people for not bailing out important enterprises and placing too much money into risk
free  government  debentures.  Those  few  managers  who  wished  to  set  aside  more
reserves to cover eventual losses of their banks were raided by the tax police. There was
no consistent set of behavioral guidelines established by governments to be followed by
the managers of SOBs. 
Representatives of various state institutions sitting in boards and supervisory boards
of  SOBs  were  following  either  the  narrow  interest  of  their  respective  government
department at best or their own personal interests at worst. These representatives were
replaced very frequently and in many cases were sent there to promote openly specific
political interests of their own constituencies. There were no prudential rules guiding
their activity either. Modern banking legislation was introduced late and changed quite
frequently. Regulatory and supervisory agencies have remained weak and overpoliticised
even  in  the  most  advanced  economies.  In  sum,  the  structures  of  both  internal  and
external  governance  have  remained  largely  inadequate  except  for  those  financial
institutions which were finally privatized to strong and prudent investors, in most cases
to first rate and reputable foreign strategic partners.
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Behind  this  generally  opaque  picture  there  are  huge  and  growing  differences  in
financial sector development among countries explained mainly by varying degree of
government  policies  and  reforms  implemented  for  modernization.  Since  these
divergences are gaining increasing importance by the day and greatly contribute to the
ever growing differences in mid-term development potential as well it is indispensable to
highlight them more in detail. 
In  this  study  I  will  basically  compare  the  experience  of  ten  Central  and  Eastern
European countries [1] which can be characterized as belonging to five groups:
1. Advanced reformers: Poland & Hungary;
2. Reluctant modernizers: Czech Republic & Slovenia;
3. Struggling with double legacy: Slovakia & Croatia;
4. Desperate reformers: Bulgaria & Romania;
5. Prolonged crisis cases: Russia & Ukraine.
It  needs  to  be  emphasized,  however,  that  the  above  classification  reflects  the
achieved level of progress made in financial sector modernization only and may not
necessarily  imply  that  the  countries  in  question  have  reached  similar  degree  of
development in other areas of structural reform. In contrast to macro reforms, where
shock therapy and comprehensive packages of adjustment can occur and be successfully
implemented all at once, in case of structural and institutional reforms at the micro level
there is only gradual progress in a rather evolutionary path which shows a cyclical pattern
over time. Nevertheless, after the first ten years of transition one lesson is clear: the
maturity and consistency of reforms aiming at financial sector modernization has proved
to be the most important factor behind the sustainable and healthy growth of financial
intermediation which, in turn, has greatly contributed to the rejuvenation and emergence
of a competitive and fast expanding real economy producing sustainable growth.
One more caveat: other factors, such as initial conditions (e.g. the degree of freedom
tolerated and achieved under the communist system, the relatively free flow of people
and ideas, the openness of higher education, the level of private property and experience
in  entrepreneurship  at  large,  etc.),  geographic  location  (i.e.  proximity  to  Western
markets), political factors such as democratic stability and maturity, cultural attitudes like
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[1]  There  are  other  important  subgroups  in  the  transition  world:  the  Baltic  republics,  the
reconstruction  economies  of  the  Balkans,  countries  of  the  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia.  For  lack  of
knowledge deep enough, I largely ignore them in this study.popular sentiments towards foreign investment, widespread and genuine desire to access
NATO and EU, etc. have also been playing a very important role in determining overall
progress in economic adjustment and modernization of the ten countries in question. No
doubt that all these factors have shaped policies and reforms targeted towards financial
sector  restructuring  and  the  results  and  failures  of  these  policies  and  reforms  have
modified the impact of all other factors as well. 
5. Advanced Reformers
• Most large banks are controlled by foreign strategic investors;
• Foreign capital has a dominant role in overall banking;
• Most banks have good portfolio, adequate reserves and capital;
• Internal corporate governance is close to Western practices;
• Quality of services is improving rapidly in corporate business;
• Fast development and wide selection of services in retail banking;
• Fairly large and liquid capital markets (gov't bond and equity);
• Advanced regulation with improving enforcement;
• Competitive environment, well-regulated entry and exit;
• Almost complete liberalization of cross-border financial services;
• Pockets of resistance in privatization and regulation;
• Advanced stage of pension reform and fund management.
Poland and Hungary both had a very liberal approach in attracting foreign direct
investment in their move to modernize the financial sector. Newly established foreign
subsidiaries  and  joint  ventures  with  SOBs  and  insurance  companies  appeared  in  the
market even before the political changes. Interestingly enough, Hungary sold off the
controlling stake in its two large state owned insurance companies by 1993 just to avoid
their bankruptcy and eventual liquidation. Moreover, all other newly established smaller
ventures in the insurance business were acquired by foreign strategic investors in the first
half of the 90s. Poland, in turn, was much more cautious and somewhat timid in this area:
its  single  state  insurance  firm  has  been  restructured  only  partially  and  still  awaits
privatization. 
Banking was much more exposed to fast track modernization in Poland. Large SOBs,
originally  established  to  serve  certain  well  defined  regions  and  partially  modernized
through twinning arrangements with experienced Western financial institutions have now
all been absorbed by foreign investors and are competing at the level of the national
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former specialized savings bank, PKO BP , which is still owned completely by the state
treasury and keeps being overburdened with the unresolved stock of the non-performing
housing loan portfolio. This is a primary example of the more sensitive and complex
nature of savings bank restructuring; the political class tends to nurture the illusion that it
is really a very special type of business, a crown jewel not to be sold to foreign investors. 
Hungary has also fallen to the same trap to a certain extent when Postabank, a newly
established and formally privately owned large spin-off emerging from the postal savings
business went bankrupt in 1998 as a consequence of brutal mismanagement and eventual
fraud. The government felt obliged to rehabilitate this bank with a huge dose of taxpayers
money and there was extensive debate whether to keep it in state ownership or privatize
it again, and, if yes, whether to sell control to a strong and prudent strategic investor or
to aim at an initial public offering only. The former savings bank, OTP is actually privatized
in that manner. (Postabank was intended to be sold to OTP without any tender but the
Hungarian government finally could not accept the price offered by OTP which was
considered ridiculously low. At present, in April 2000 the government is talking about
selling  or  transferring  Postabank  to  the  state  owned  Post  Office.)  In  Poland,  Bank
Handlowy was proud of having no controlling stakeholder for a long time just to see itself
being swallowed by Citibank almost completely at the beginning of 2000 after a not so
disguised  takeover  bid  from  the  German  Commerzbank  had  been  opposed  by  the
Treasury. This example clearly shows that, despite political resentment and fierce debate,
privatization by selling control to a reputable foreign strategic partner is by far the most
successful way of stabilizing and modernizing ailing SOBs. If control is effectively kept
either by the government or self-serving management even in case of majority private
ownership it can easily lead to a sharp downturn of the fortunes of the bank. In turn, if
and when management is prudent and supported by quality investors, the bank may fall
prey to large strategic bidders in a fast consolidating market. 
Foreign strategic investment in most leading banks have proved to be an unqualified
success in both Poland and Hungary after several consecutive efforts of government
orchestrated and financed consolidation of insolvent SOBs. Foreign strategic partners
have  been  able  and  willing  to  provide  not  only  much  needed  additional  capital  and
management skills but contributed considerably to product development and innovation,
modernization of risk management and treasury operations, internal audit and control,
information technology, etc.
It is no coincidence that Poland and Hungary provide the best example for capital
market development as well. Both countries have a fairly large, well capitalized and rather
liquid  equity  market  by  regional  standards.  This  regional  leading  position  is  a  very
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importance (Poland) of a mass scheme in privatization. Instead, governments and market
participants decided to rely on two important factors: a gradual and by the mid 90s
complete liberalization of foreign portfolio investment (coupled with early capital account
convertibility for this type of investment) and high level of transparency by adopting and
enforcing the latest Western standards on information dissemination, listing rules, price
formation, clearing and settlement, etc. High level of self regulation has characterized
both institutions all along which has helped tremendously to recreate the culture and
trust needed for a steady growth of turnover in capital market transactions. Apart from
trading in equity, the Warsaw Stock Exchange has developed a sizeable corporate bond
market  while  the  Budapest  Stock  Exchange  has  become  very  active  in  trading
government  securities.  Derivative  instruments,  such  as  options  and  futures  are  also
traded,  albeit  this  market  is  still  in  an  incipient  stage  in  both  countries.  Poland  and
Hungary  has  already  started  a  comprehensive  overhaul  of  their  pension  system  by
establishing a three-pillar structure with fully funded and privately managed mandatory
and voluntary schemes. These latter – together with the private insurance companies –
are now providing the backbone of domestic institutional investment by channeling a
growing amount of contractual savings through the recognized capital markets.
The deepness of financial sector reform in these two countries are reflected by the
high and sustainable level of economic growth achieved in the last 4–5 years. There is
already a wide choice of financial services readily available for real sector firms on a
competitive basis. Due to the broad liberalization of cross-border financial transactions at
least in the longer end of the market the largest ventures – including the foreign ones –
can easily finance themselves even from abroad. Mid-size companies have dozens of
banks wooing them and also have access to the less heavily regulated segments of the
private capital market. Small firms, however, still face certain difficulties – only a few
banks have decided to serve this market segments. At the same time difficulties of banks
with keeping a track record of these small ventures, assessing their risk-return profile and
foreclosing collateral in case of default has to be acknowledged as well.
6. Reluctant Modernizers
• Largest banks are still under government control or just recently privatized;
• Postponed and half-hearted moves to invite foreign strategic investors;
• Rehabilitation of leading banks is under way or recently completed;
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• Corporate governance is to be strengthened further considerably;
• Quality of services, retail banking are developing rapidly;
• Smaller, quite fragmented and rather illiquid capital markets;
• Improving regulation with few loopholes and uneven enforcement;
• Increasing competition in domestic financial services;
• Non-bank financial intermediation is in need of further reforms;
• Some resentment and resistance against further liberalization;
• Pension reform and fund management are still at an incipient stage.
The Czech Republic and Slovenia are prime examples of countries where certain
favorable initial conditions – especially high level of per capita income based on rich
industrial tradition and a sophisticated economic structure well developed by regional
standards; new impetus provided by becoming liberated from being obliged to support
less  developed  parts  of  the  country  as  a  consequence  of  the  breakup  of  both
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – have turned out to be a mixed blessing. Both countries
enjoyed unprecedented political stability and a quite extended honeymoon period with
the same government or grand coalition for a long time. The tremendous success of early
macrostabilization  coupled  with  a  successful  shift  of  export  orientation  to  Western
markets has produced a sense of complacency and great reluctance to undertake more
substantive and painful structural reforms such as financial sector modernization. Both
countries undertook an early recapitalization of their largest financial firms and then
decided to stop there. Governments were clearly and publicly against selling control of
the flagship banks and insurance companies to any foreign investor. Quite the opposite;
either they claimed that banks were already in private hands (in case of the Czech
Republic  large  banks  were  formally  half  privatized  as  a  consequence  of  the  mass
privatization) or decided that in the absence of strong domestic investors it is better to
keep them under close state control (Slovenia).
Mass privatization does not seem to have helped financial sector modernization. In
the Czech Republic at least two of the largest banks – Komercni Banka (KB) and Investicni
a Postovni Banka (IPB) – felt obliged to continue financing many of their traditional and
still unrestructured clients a good number of which became also owned by them through
the investment management companies they established. Increasing equity holdings of
banks in their clients' capital was seen as copying the seemingly positive German practice
of intimate relationship between banks and industrial enterprises without having the
burden of German regulation and the German investors themselves. Slovenia used to
have similar aversion toward foreign investors. Even foreign financial investors have not
always been welcome in large banks, brokerages and insurance companies. The Yugoslav
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way of mass privatization has created even more conflicts of interests because in this
latter case banks were frequently owned by their less than fully creditworthy clients
rather than the other way around. This is clearly considered the most dangerous way of
interlocking ownership representing a vicious cycle.
The cost of reluctance and complacency has proved to be especially high for the
Czech Republic. This is perfectly reflected by the forced renationalization and immediate
sale of the falling IPB to Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB) in June, 2000 which
was a really unprecedented move in the history of bank consolidation and privatization.
There are several lessons drawn from this case.
First, there is no point to sell even relative majority stake to any foreign entity if real
management control and responsibility is not transferred. Second, not all good sounding
foreign names represent trademarks of truly prudent strategic partners. Third, and most
important, governments should prepare very carefully the legal documentation for all
transactions making sure that after due diligence, the value of the assets is reasonably and
realistically assessed and any remaining uncertainties regarding asset value and contingent
liabilities  are  perfectly  identified  and  the  assets  involved  clearly  ring-fenced.
Unfortunately, none of these fundamental conditions seem to have been met when the
formal transaction of selling IPB to Nomura took place in 1997. As a consequence, a
textbook  case  of  moral  hazard  emerged  where  the  private  partners  were  able  and
allowed to privatize all the gains and the (new) Czech government finally got obliged to
socialize all the losses. The cost of rehabilitation for the three large Czech banks will also
finally exceed 10% of GDP . It could have been much lower had these banks been sold to
reputable and prudent foreign strategic investors right after the initial cleanup. (That
happened well before the breakup of Czechoslovakia and eliminated all non-performing
assets inherited from the communist period.) Even though the Czech Republic can now
easily afford the resulting increase of its public domestic debt, this is a serious loss of
opportunity in terms of lower growth and slower catching up with the EU.
Slovenia  has  been  less  complacent  in  policy  making  and  declarations  but  equally
reluctant in inviting foreign stakeholders in financial sector institutions. The two largest
banks, Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) are still
controlled by the treasury and no specific plans for their final privatization are in sight.
Although  some  foreign  banks  established  wholly  owned  subsidiaries  and  started  to
compete with the two large banks as well as the smaller regional financial institutions, the
small Slovene market has become so much overcrowded that now there is a serious
threat that the two large public banks will lose market share quickly especially when free
branching will be the rule of the game by the time of EU accession. In addition, Slovenia
imposed quite a few breaks on the flows of not only short term but also equity capital inan apparent move to defend the domestic currency and has kept them in place until very
recently. Even direct investment in non-financial firms has been sometimes discouraged
perpetuating the inefficiencies of enterprises caused by the flawed mass privatization
program  which,  in  turn,  have  effectively  blocked  any  major  restructuring  by  making
impossible to reduce excessive labor and keeping salaries much higher than affordable,
sustainable and reasonable. 
Government policies did not facilitate quick adjustment and deep restructuring either.
Payroll taxes are intolerably high just to support a very generous and hardly reformed
pay-as-you-go  pension  system  and  an  overextended  health  care.  Private  initiative  in
managing pension funds as well as insurance premia and other contractual savings are in
an incipient stage – only partially accessible to foreign players. In sum, it is a fair statement
that the Slovene financial sector is clearly underperforming its potential because – apart
from successful bank rehabilitation – it has not been exposed to any major fundamental
reform so far.
It is also the irony of history that both the Czech and Slovene equity markets are
much smaller and less liquid than the Polish and Hungarian ones not so much despite
but  largely  because  of  the  unfavorable  initial  conditions  created  by  the  mass
privatization schemes. Again, the Czech equity markets constitute a perfect example
of what went wrong. At first sight mass privatization programs seem to have provided
a magnificent one time boost for the formal capitalization of open markets especially
in the absence of any meaningful criteria for listing and information dissemination on
stocks. Ideological extremism have even praised the lack of requirements for entry in
name  of  unlimited  liberalism  to  create  markets  first  rather  than  kill  them  with
burdensome regulation and heavy supervisory structures. But the lack of transparency
and  enforceable  rules  have  proved  to  be  an  open  invitation  to  abuse  and  finally
resulted in a backlash by creating widespread disillusionment with and even hatred
against stock markets. 
Negative sentiments especially among foreign portfolio investors coupled with
heroic  efforts  of  some  enlightened  officials  of  the  otherwise  weak  and  politically
targeted supervisory agency have recently resulted in tightening regulations just to
recreate trust and confidence which has either been lost or never created. The Prague
SE have delisted hundreds of firms in the last couple of years but despite introducing
and enforcing tough rules for listing and continuous disclosure its overall turnover was
still less than one third of the Budapest SE in 1999. (Hungary constitutes by far the
best comparator for the Czech Republic for having the same size of its economy –
roughly  GDP  50  bn  USD  –  and  with  the  same  population  –  10  million  people  –
shrinking and ageing quite rapidly).
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• Largest banks are or about to be sold to foreign strategic investors;
• Strong drive to privatize all banks after costly systemic rehabilitation;
• Number of insolvent banks still to be rehabilitated or finally liquidated;
• Portfolio quality is largely poor except for some midsize banks;
• Prudential behavior is still marginal in corporate governance;
• Quality of services, retail banking are slowly improving;
• Small and illiquid capital markets with low foreign participation;
• Improving regulation but still timid and uneven enforcement;
• Weak competition with regional and sectoral segmentation;
• Non-bank financial intermediation is in an incipient stage;
• Serious intention and efforts to liberalize cross-border transactions;
• Deep fiscal and structural problems; pension reform postponed.
The political and economic development of Slovakia and Croatia during the first
decade of transition is strikingly similar while they constitute a marked antidote to the
Czech Republic and Slovenia with which they used to have a common fate and history for
almost 70 years, respectively. Both countries had nationalist and autocratic governments
for a prolonged period after regaining independence in early 90s. Since Croatia was
involved in an armed struggle for restoring its own territorial integrity and indirectly also
in Bosnia, nationalist tendencies have become more deeply rooted and caused more
distortions in the weak economy and fragile social fabric than in Slovakia. Charismatic and
populist political leaders attempted to create a domestic oligarchy in both countries
which gained prominence quickly in insider transactions following the mass privatization
programs which had been started still in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
Initial  conditions  were  much  less  favorable  for  the  development  of  financial
institutions in many respects. Both countries have inherited a more inward and eastward
oriented and less competitive real economy with disproportionately high emphasis on
less than state-of-the-art heavy industries (e.g. shipbuilding in Croatia and armaments in
Slovakia). Markets for these products have collapsed very quickly and neither of these
countries have been able to regain sustainable export led growth ever since. Overall real
sector modernization has proved to be painstakingly slow as weak insiders – in most
cases former managers and newly emerging political clients – effectively blocked external
participation, including much needed foreign investment. Relatively high growth in the
mid nineties was short lived because it was based on an artificial boost of demand fueled
by corporate borrowing in both countries and, in addition, by reconstruction boom in
17
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overspending  made  it  possible  to  hide  structural  weaknesses  and  postpone  serious
reforms addressing them for long.
Major  financial  institutions  became  formally  private  almost  by  definition  as  a
consequence of the mass privatization schemes, too. Croatia – like any other former
Yugoslav member state – had experienced the least advantageous form of privatization.
When workers' self-management had formally been transformed into share ownership
for insiders, banks immediately and almost automatically fell into the hands of their still
unrestructured clients. In addition, the strong regionalization of Croatia – reflected also
in  the  name  of  its  banks  –  created  local  monopolies  with  little  or  no  competition.
Autocratic governments in both countries promoted very actively a sense of national
unity by assisting the establishment of interlocking ownership between local firms and
financial institutions blessed and sanctioned by local governments. An intimate web of
mutual services and the lack of transparency created an extremely fertile ground for
political abuse and corruption which finally resulted in the collapse of many banks in
1997–98. Rehabilitation has proved to be an unusually broad and expensive exercise in
both  countries  and  covered  almost  the  whole  sector,  public  and  private  financial
institutions alike. 
The legacy of this futile experiment with oligarchic development is as damaging as
that of the communist system. Broad coalitions of democratic parties are now trying to
overcome the dire consequences of these distortions by implementing bold reforms
aimed at catching up with the most advanced transition economies. 
In Slovakia, the government has cleaned up the portfolio of the three largest SOBs,
Vseobecna  Uverova  Banka  (VUB),  Investicna  a  Rozvoja  Banka  (IRB)  and  Slovenska
Sporitelna (SS) and has announced its determination to sell controlling stakes in all of
them to first class foreign strategic partners as quickly as it is possible. (The sale of SS to
Erste Bank has already been effectively completed.) Legal and regulatory modernization
as well as corrections of insider privatization deals take place at a rapid pace together
with  a  strong  drive  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment  in  large  non-financial  firms.
Sweeping financial liberalization and other bold structural reforms resulted in Slovakia
becoming the 30th member of OECD in 2000. 
Croatia, for its part, has successfully completed the privatization of its flagship bank,
Privredna Banka Zagreb (PBZ) while continuing its serious efforts to attract strategic
partners  for  a  number  of  midsize  banks.  (The  sale  of  control  to  strong  foreign
professional  investors  in  Rijecka  Banka  (RB)  and  Splitska  Banka  (SB)  have  also  been
finalized.) However, the liquidation of a number of deeply insolvent midsize banks –
including  one  of  the  largest  and  most  important,  Dubrovacka  Banka,  need  to  be
18
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completed in Croatia before good governance could become predominant in managing
financial institutions. Insurance still remains largely unrestructured in both countries while
foreign players are gaining ground very quickly at the expense of the state owned former
monopoly. 
Again, the irony of history is that the Slovak and most likely the new Croat authorities
will  show  more  genuine  desire  to  introduce  the  most  advanced  best  practices  of
corporate restructuring, insolvency, liquidation, restructuring and at the same time spare
no real effort to woo much needed foreign direct investment just to compensate for the
worse image their countries have acquired compared to the more favorable perceptions
of international investors about the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Given their double
legacy  and  their  less  developed  economic  structure,  Slovakia  and  Croatia  are
encountering more difficulties in attracting a sizeable amount of FDI carried out by truly
reputable foreign firms. This is especially true in case of financial institutions where the
prime motive of interest and action on the part of foreign strategic investors is not so
much the present net asset value of existing ventures but the future growth potential of
the whole economy and the chances of the country to access quickly the EU. Slovakia
tends to be much more fortunate in this regard. It may even be able to catch up with the
first tier accession candidates and join the EU together with them at the same time while
Croatia has yet to start serious negotiations at all.
As far as capital market development is concerned mass privatization coupled with
the lack of adequate regulation and enforcement proved to be detrimental to substantive
takeoff.  Within  the  equally  bleak  picture  there  are  certain  differences  leading  the
observer to conclude that the Slovak equity market has more stocks and perhaps more
liquidity but the Croats have some larger firms with better quality (Pliva, Podravka and
Zagrebacka Banka are well known names even in the international arena.) Legislation and
regulation have improved recently but enforcement still has much to desire. Latecomers
are struggling not only with the already mentioned dire legacy of oligarchic development
but  with  the  lack  of  enthusiasm  for  going  and  remain  public.  The  small  size  of  the
domestic market coupled with the lack of institutional funds to be invested constitute
additional impediments in the short run. Fiscal constraints and strong vested interests in
maintaining generous pension privileges – especially in Croatia – will make any effort to
provide a strong boost to contractual savings highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Conversely, government bond markets have a better chance to expand quickly due to the
sizeable fiscal deficits and debt in both countries. 
It is an interesting feature of the institutional arrangement in both countries that their
central  banks  play  a  crucial  role  not  only  in  overall  banking  regulation  but  also  in
supervision and oversight. Since both institutions assumed the role of a proper central20
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bank and started issuing money and regulating money supply only ten years ago it is no
surprise that there is a relatively weak institutional capacity to carry out all these new
functions. Both central banks have made an almost impeccable job in implementing strict
monetary  policies  which  has  contributed  significantly  to  the  maintenance  of
macroeconomic stability throughout the nineties. Prudential regulation and supervision,
in turn, proved to be politically sensitive and controversial because of the strong vested
interests, which, more often than not, worked against prudent practices. It is not so much
the weak intellectual capacity but the lack of political support which has prevented the
tough rules of prudential regulation and supervision from implementation.
8. Desperate Reformers
• Few large insolvent banks are still in government hands;
• Desperate attempts to sell systemic banks to foreign strategic investors;
• A number of insolvent banks still to be rehabilitated or liquidated;
• Good portfolio expands slowly because creditworthy clients are few;
• Prudential behavior is still marginal in corporate governance;
• Quality of services slowly improving, retail banking expands faster;
• Very small and illiquid capital markets with low foreign participation;
• Improving regulation with uneven and unpredictable enforcement;
• Weak competition, foreign subsidiaries play marginal role in Romania;
• Non-bank financial intermediation is in an incipient stage;
• Liberalization of cross-border transactions yet to be achieved;
• Lack of institutional investors, no pension reform in sight.
Except  for  Albania  and  the  former  members  of  the  now  defunct  Soviet  Union,
Romania and Bulgaria have truly inherited nothing but the worst from the communist
system in Eastern Europe. Both countries used to have extremely rigid, neo-Stalinist
economic management systems, maybe with more tolerance toward small scale auxiliary
ventures  in  Bulgarian  agriculture  but  especially  devastating  autarchic  tendencies  in
Romania. While preserving national statehood after World War II may have been an asset,
public institutions have proved to be very weak with a quite shallow implementation
capacity ever since. 
Political fragmentation, especially in Romania, has led to a further weakening of the
reform drive which has not resulted in a critical mass of consistent measures to be
introduced in almost any important area of the transition agenda. Romania lost not only21
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the first six years of transition by postponing structural reforms but also the next four
when  a  center-right  multiparty  coalition  government  remained  largely  paralyzed  by
constant factional fighting. Bulgaria, in turn, has been more fortunate. After the deep crisis
of 1996 and 1997 an unusually strong and unified government has tried to make up for
the lost time by restoring not only macrofinancial stability but starting also corporate
restructuring,  privatization  and  financial  sector  modernization.  Despite  the  additional
negative impact of external factors, such as the Russian crisis and the war in Kosovo, the
disruption in trade and transportation links, etc. Bulgaria has managed to distinguish itself
as  having  an  economy  with  the  best  mid-term  perspectives  in  the  whole  Balkans.
Nevertheless,  both  countries  have  a  long  way  to  go  before  they  can  truly  satisfy
membership criteria for EU and close the income gap with other candidates.
Banking sector development was started with the establishment of three or four large
(typically  a  foreign  trade,  an  industry  and  an  agriculture  orientated)  SOBs  without
transforming the old savings bank into a universal financial institution. The left-leaning
socialist governments in the first half of the nineties did not consider bank privatization
seriously. All they did was to allow the proliferation of new and small private commercial
banks as a consequence of a quite liberal policy on entry which could also be interpreted
as  a  lack  of  adequate  regulation  on  minimum  capital  standards  and  prudential
requirements of ownership. These small banks constituted a mixed blessing because
most of them turned out to be almost like pyramid schemes and went bankrupt quickly
providing  good  excuse  for  those  who  opposed  privatization  of  banks  altogether.
However, the large SOBs did not perform better either and virtually all of them in both
countries proved to be technically insolvent by the mid nineties as well.  
Reactions to this disappointing development were somewhat different in the two
countries mostly because of the diverging political solutions to the emerging crisis. In
Bulgaria, the whole unreformed economy collapsed at the end of 1996 and the new
authorities made a complete U-turn on policy. They decided to rehabilitate all SOBs by
cleaning up entirely their loan portfolio and announced an uncompromising and ambitious
privatization  program  involving  foreign  strategic  investors.  The  Bank  Consolidation
Company  (BCC),  established  in  1992  to  manage  the  rehabilitation  of  SOBs,  was
empowered  to  direct  individual  transactions  of  selling  control  to  reputable  foreign
investors. Given the dire situation of the Bulgarian economy in 1996–97 and the quite
negative image of the country it has been extremely difficult to attract prudent foreign
partners. But the steadfastness and perseverance of the government has actually paid off. 
The Bulgarian government has made very wise and careful decisions on timing and
sequencing and it was able to build up momentum and change gradually the perception
of the outside world on the perspectives of the Bulgarian economy. The easiest target,22
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Postbank, a newly established and hence relatively unspoiled small SOB plus a spinoff of
the large foreign trade monopoly, the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB) went off the hook
first, followed by two somewhat larger, regionally important and but still more easily
restructured SOBs (Expressbank and Hebrosbank). The privatization of the largest and
by far the most important bank, the former foreign trade monopoly, Bulbank, which
covers almost 40% of the economy was finally successfully completed in 2000 despite
fierce and open resistance of the incumbent management to the sale of control to foreign
strategic interests. Only two large SOBs remain to be sold – Biochim and Savings Bank –
which  may  not  be  too  difficult  given  the  good  momentum  generated  by  recent
transactions.
Romania has been able to make much less progress in both bank rehabilitation and
privatization. While BancPost, a similar newly established and healthy SOB was easily sold
together with the relatively clean and small Development Bank (BRpD) there has been
no real progress on the very large, truly systemic banks. On the contrary: the flagship
bank, Bancorex, the former foreign trade monopoly had been recapitalized five times
costing more than 1 bn USD to the Romanian taxpayer just to see itself finally liquidated
in 1999. Banca Agricola (BA) had also been rehabilitated several times and cut drastically
in size without any hope of a quick sale apparently due to the lack of political agreement
on a coherent privatization strategy and, lately due to very little outside interest. Banca
Comerciala Romana (BCR), which was perceived as the healthiest one among the large
three remains in government hands as well. Given the volatile political environment and
the excessive bargaining power of the managers of the SOBs – who were appointed on
the basis of their political affiliation according to coalition agreements – there seems to
be no quick fix for these two large SOBs, nor for the recently corporatized Savings Bank
(CEC). 
Given  these  circumstances,  it  is  almost  inconceivable  to  expect  substantive
improvements  either  in  corporate  governance  and  prudent  behavior  or  quality  of
services, quality of assets, internal audit, risk management, credit allocation, etc. While
legislation has improved considerably in the second half of the nineties in both countries,
enforcement has remained uneven, unpredictable and sometimes politically conditioned,
especially in Romania. Shallow implementation capacity constitutes a real bottleneck in
both jurisdictions. None of the two central banks have ever been up to the requirements
of crisis prevention and management. 
The lack of confidence and the confusion about rules and values to be upheld are
clearly highlighted by the events in the series of mini banking crises hitting Romania in
2000. As a side effect of the collapse of a sizeable investment fund crowds also run on
BCR for retrieving deposits while at the same time three other midsize banks were23
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 38 – Experience and Perspectives of Financial ...
brought under receivership. (One of them was the proudly named International Bank of
Religion.) In the meantime courts rejected the request of the National Bank of Romania
(NBR) for declaring a powerful regional bank, Dacia Felix (DF) bankrupt – precisely two
years after it had originally been submitted. And when the bank was finally declared
insolvent, the new leftist government forced NBR and CEC to accept a partial settlement
in order to pull DFB out of liquidation in early 2001. This clearly reflects the lack of clear
interpretation  and  enforcement  of  banking  regulation  as  well  as  the  continuation  of
arbitrary political interference in managing the financial sector.
Capital markets are very small and illiquid in Romania and Bulgaria despite or because
of  the  flawed  and  botched  mass  privatization  programs  which  flooded  the  initially
underregulated equity markets with hundreds – in case of Romania with thousands – of
low quality stocks. While there have been heroic efforts in both countries to introduce
serious confidence building measures by creating all necessary infrastructure for trading,
clearing and settlement as well as listing and information dissemination neither domestic
nor foreign participants have invested any meaningful amount of money in those two
markets so far. 
The underdeveloped nature of banking, insurance and capital markets in Romania and
Bulgaria is strongly correlated with the incipient results in restructuring the real economy.
It  is  absolutely  clear  that  the  severe  distortions  caused  by  inept  and  irresponsible
communist  megalomania  render  the  legacy  extremely  difficult  to  deal  with  –  again,
especially in Romania. A very large number of sizable industrial firms are not privatizable
at all even after financial liquidation and dismemberment. In quite a few important cases
only the physical closure of enterprises makes sense because markets are completely
lost,  the  technology  involved  is  outdated  and  harmful  to  health,  there  is  immense
ecological degradation and only financial liabilities rather than any assets at all. 
In light of these extremely disadvantageous initial conditions the predominance of
mass  privatization  schemes  in  both  countries  was  even  more  harmful  than  in  more
mature industrial economies, like the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Mass privatization not
only created an illusion of acquiring real positive value but also a formidable obstacle to
painful restructuring and aversion to realize losses. It is no surprise that prudent banks
find it extremely difficult to lend to the real sector because creditworthy clients with
manageable risk are very few are far between. This is especially true in Bulgaria where
most of the systemic banks are now in the hands of reputable and strong foreign strategic
investors.   
The  establishment  of  a  market  economy  depends  largely  on  new  ventures  both
domestic and foreign. Since foreign direct and portfolio investment have been quite
negligible  in  non-financial  sectors,  both  economies  have  depended  mostly  on  the24
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expansion  and  organic  development  of  domestically  owned  small  and  medium  size
enterprises (SMEs). Due to the rapid contraction of the state sector the incipient and
vibrant private sector simply has not been able to compensate for all losses in overall
output. In addition, SMEs are much less bankable and have little access to open capital
markets as well. Thus the state of affairs in the financial sector is just a mirror image of
the hardships in the real economy.  
Apart from the growing arrears in certain enterprises, especially in large public
utilities and the ballooning intercorporate debt reflecting soft budget constraints and
lack of strong market discipline which would involve credible threats of bankruptcy
and liquidation, fiscal prudence has largely been maintained in the second half of the
nineties  in  both  countries.  Bulgaria  was  clearly  helped  by  the  currency  board
arrangement (CBA) introduced in the summer of 1997 but even Romania, which was
reported as being on the verge of a financial collapse from time to time has been able
to  maintain  fiscal  discipline  and  outperformed  even  Hungary  in  terms  of  general
government balance. The sad irony here is that fiscal prudence alone is not a recipe
for restarting economic growth especially if there is no supply side adjustment in the
economy  due  to  the  lack  of  flexible  micro  structures  able  to  respond  to  market
signals.  Postponing  structural  reforms  time  and  again  might  render  prudent
macroeconomic policies largely useless or even harmful. Romania has proved to be an
almost textbook case for this lesson.
9. Prolonged Crisis Cases
• Most banks are in private hands and the majority of them insolvent;
• Selective rehabilitation and reluctance to invite foreign strategic partners;
• Large number of banks to be delicensed and liquidated;
• Portfolio quality is very poor, hardly improving;
• Rampant corruption, crime and cronyism;
• Low service quality, rudimentary retail banking;
• Small, discredited and abused capital markets;
• Weak regulation and openly politicised enforcement;
• Fragmentation and monopolization of domestic markets;
• Non-banking financial intermediation is almost nonexistent;
• Largely hostile attitude towards financial liberalization;
• Permanent fiscal crisis, pension reform is not on the agenda.25
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Russia and Ukraine represent such peculiar cases that they hardly find their place
in  international  comparison.  Russia  is  very  special  for  its  sheer  size  and  strategic
importance while Ukraine is unique for its truly permanent crisis and apparent lack of
opportunities. Russia could well afford not to implement any serious structural reform
because its vast exportable natural resources coupled with its fine ability to extract
large amount of financial assistance from the Western countries have always helped to
survive the worst of its crises. Ukraine has given up its nuclear arsenal and does not
posses any meaningful amount of natural wealth. Moreover, regaining full sovereignty
after  300  years  of  Russian  dominance  is  not  an  easy  task.  The  Ukrainian  state  is
particularly weak, became very fragmented and has easily fallen prey to the emerging
local oligarchy. In Russia the ruling elite (the political class and the oligarchy) is largely
unwilling  while  in  Ukraine  it  is  unable  to  introduce  substantive  market  oriented
reforms.
Financial  sector  development  was  very  similar  until  the  mid  nineties.  Like  in
Romania and Bulgaria, three to four large SOBs were originally carved out of the
mainframe of the former central bank of the Soviet Union. Saving banks which were
operating throughout the communist period maintained their narrow focus for many
years. There was also hyperinflation which eliminated not only the value of banking
assets  but  also  that  of  the  liabilities,  realizing  a  very  special  "bank  rehabilitation
scheme"  financed  exclusively  and  involuntarily  by  the  depositors.  This  devastating
crisis, however, created a magnificent window of opportunity to strengthen the hard
core of the banking sector by privatizing the SOBs of systemic importance in a prudent
and efficient way. Unfortunately this moment was lost because the political class in
both countries remained at least very suspicious if not openly hostile to the idea of
selling their perceived "crown jewels" to foreign investors. Instead, they decided to
create quickly a domestically rooted echelon of large entrepreneurs by allowing some
well connected people to emerge as tycoons by acquiring immense chunks of former
state  property  for  a  symbolic  price.  This  artificially  and  deliberately  accelerated
"original accumulation of capital" was first assisted by selective licensing of foreign
trade transactions in a still largely closed economy then by the mass privatization
schemes  which  resulted  in  concentrating  large  amount  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of
insiders and finally – mostly in Russia – by the "loans for shares" schemes when a
handful of these previously privileged individuals were offered the chance to take over
the  controlling  stakes  in  large  chunks  of  the  extractive  industries.  In  Russia  the
emerging oligarchy was able to acquire control over the large SOBs as well while in
Ukraine most of them are still in government hands but have lost considerable market
share to new and private financial institutions.26
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 38 – L. Bokros
Another common feature of banking sector development in Russia and Ukraine was
the rapid proliferation of small private financial houses in the first half of the nineties. Like
in Romania and Bulgaria this tendency was not so much the result of a genuine drive for
liberal market reforms but rather due to the lack of meaningful and consistently applied
legislation and regulation for a long time. Although banking laws and rules have been
improved considerably in the last three years in both countries, central banks are still
struggling with the immense backlog of delicensing these small, frequently non operating
banklike creatures. 
From systemic point of view, however, it is more important to analyze the situation
and health of the large banks operating nationwide. It is a common feature of banking in
both  countries  that  even  the  large  banks  play  only  a  very  marginal  role  in  financial
intermediation in general and in financing the real sector in particular. That is one of the
most important reasons why the collapse of the whole Russian financial system in August,
1998 did not really trigger a serious downturn in the real economy. On the other hand,
the insignificant role of banks in financing real sector activity did not prevent the same
banks from accumulating huge losses in their loan and investment portfolio. Although it is
true  that  the  August  1998  meltdown  was  basically  triggered  by  the  collapse  of  the
government debt market and further exacerbated by the devaluation of the Russian
currency this is not to conceal the fact that the crisis was only making illiquid already
insolvent banks. At present the reverse is also true; the actual refloating of the Russian
economy as a consequence of the exceptionally high export prices for oil and some other
natural resources coupled with newly found fiscal discipline and real sector growth largely
due to opportunities of import substitution has restored liquidity for quite a few banks
while in most cases their more fundamental problem of deep insolvency has not been
addressed at all.
There  are  at  least  two  more  reasons  why  financial  intermediation  have  not
developed in a more satisfactory manner. First, real sector decline was dramatic in
both countries. Russia lost roughly half of its former output while Ukraine more than
60% in the 90s. Contrary to what happened in Romania and Bulgaria, even SMEs
could not develop fast enough in these rapidly declining economies due to another
important  factor  worth  mentioning  here:  self-serving  bureaucratic  bottlenecks,
devastating criminalization of economic and social life and finally rampant corruption.
Rent seeking behavior and public acceptance of corruption is predominant. It cripples
almost  all  economic  activity  but  first  and  foremost  productive  investment.  As  a
consequence, except for firms in the export sector, creditworthy clients are few and
far between while opportunities to make money in corporate lending are scarce and
profitability is much higher in other areas. Retail  banking  was  even  less  lucrative  under  these  dire  circumstances,  therefore
banks did not put high emphasis in developing these services, either. Banks were and have
largely remained much more interested in acting as brokerage firms in the incipient but
at least in Russia at one stage fast expanding capital markets.
Capital market developments are very different in the two countries concerned.
Russia was a real magnet for foreign portfolio investors at least before the crisis even
though legislation and regulation concerning property rights, transfer of title, minority
protection, clearing and settlement, foreign exchange controls, etc. are still far from
perfect even today. This exceptional appeal for investments in Russia was explained by
the sheer size of the potential rather than actual market, the overall attractiveness of the
export  oriented  extractive  industries,  the  marked  liberalization  of  foreign  portfolio
investment  and  finally  the  significant  amount  of  public  borrowing  which  created  a
speculative market for state debentures. In Ukraine none of these factors were present
except for the last one which proved to be insufficient in light of political instability and
lack of strategic importance.
Things  have  changed  considerably  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Russian  crisis.  Since
influential people – including reputable foreign firms – have lost a fortune when capital and
foreign exchange markets collapsed, it is very unlikely that the same enthusiastic rush for
Russian equity and government paper will materialize in the foreseeable future. Russia is not
keen to step into the same river either. Recent efforts to keep tight budget controls and at
the same time implement fundamental reforms in taxation suggest that the authorities do
not intend to restart massive foreign borrowing even after the oil bonanza. There is more
hope to see a gradual revitalization of the equity markets in the long run if and when much
needed changes in basic legislation and corporate behavior will take place.
While clearly there is opportunity if not certainty for the Russian real economy to
take off, Ukraine is likely to prolong further its permanent crisis. The political class is
more fragmented than ever and the government – which is led by the former central
bank governor as a last resort to technocratic leadership – does not seem to have
either the impetus or the political support to undertake any of the desperately needed
basic  reforms,  such  as  public  expenditure  reshuffle,  tax  administration,  legal
environment  and  practice  for  corporate  bankruptcy,  bank  rehabilitation  and  real
privatization as well as alleviating the burden on SMEs, reducing red tape, fighting
corruption and crime, reorganizing agriculture, the energy sector, physical and human
infrastructure,  creating  a  favorable,  appealing  environment  for  foreign  direct  and
portfolio investment, etc. Unfortunately, in terms of implementing efficient public
policies  and  micro  reforms,  there  is  no  one  single  bright  spot  on  the  horizon  of
Ukraine in the short and medium run.
27
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If there are countries and cultures where the vast majority of the population has lost
its trust almost entirely in public institutions and domestic financial firms it is Russia and
Ukraine  –  and  without  doubt,  most  other  countries  of  the  CIS.  To  change  this  still
deteriorating trend will require heroic efforts and a sea change in behavior on the part of
the respective governments and the ruling oligarchies.
10. Three Pillars of Financial Sector Development
As it is quite obvious even from a sketchy analysis of the political economy of
financial sector development in the transition world, the formation and evolution of
reliable channels of financial intermediation throughout the 90s has been very different
from one country to the next and there is no reason to believe that this trend of
marked  divergence  will  be  soon  replaced  by  strong  convergence  toward  well
developed  and  mature  structures.  Some  countries  will  join  the  dream  land  of  the
European common market within a very short historic period of time. Others will
perhaps wait for another generation before getting in. There might be a tendency
towards equalization in income generating capacity among the transition economies
after another decade of differentiation. But there will be no easy reversal of the culture
and  tradition  which  is  so  detrimental  to  the  expansion  of  healthy  financial
intermediation fostered by efficiently managed and prudently behaving institutions. The
emergence and dominance of local oligarchies, sometimes stronger than the state itself
and characterized by rent seeking behavior, asset stripping, state capture, crime and
corruption could well become so embedded in the social fabric that it is no longer
possible to get rid of it without a devastating, full blown crisis of the economic and
societal system. 
Slovakia and Bulgaria have been very fortunate for having been able to change
course  relatively  early  on;  Croatia  has  now  every  hope  to  follow  suit.  Romania,
however, is fast approaching a historic crossroad: the results of parliamentary elections
in 2000 clearly strengthened nationalist and populist elements. Some other countries,
most notably Russia and Ukraine do not seem to have a historic chance to break the
overarching influence of their oligarchies in the short run. But the strongly appealing
perspectives of EU-accession and the genuine desire of the local electorate to achieve
Western  economic  standards  by  embracing  not  only  the  values  of  an  open  and
competitive market economy but also accepting all its consequences can be crucial in
a mid term horizon and may bring about substantive change. It is clearly in the interestand the moral obligation of people involved in the development business to facilitate
the accumulation and strengthening of all creative elements which promote prudent
civic culture and establish a tradition of individual integrity and honesty in business and
civic life. 
In the area of financial sector development there seem to be three fundamental pillars
determining the scope, nature and quality of institutions emerging there and influencing
the basic course of development these institutions embark upon:
1. Internal and external governance structures;
2. Domestic and international competition;
3. Prudential regulation and supervision.
These three pillars are mutually complementary and overlapping: improvements in
one  area  clearly  help  the  modernization  and  strengthening  in  the  two  others.
Nevertheless, there is a critical mass in all three areas which must be achieved in order
to reach maturity of the financial system and put it upon a secure path of sustainable
expansion and development while maintaining high level of trust and confidence at the
same time. Unfortunately none of the transition countries have reached that stage of
development yet; the regulatory and supervisory structures need to show considerable
further progress even in Poland and Hungary.
10.1. Corporate Governance
• Once for all rehabilitation of viable SOBs of systemic importance;
• Recapitalization of private commercial banks only in exceptional cases;
• SOBs to be privatized immediately after restoring minimum solvency;
• By selling controlling stake to reputable foreign strategic investors;
• General depoliticization and professionalization of financial intermediation;
• Discontinuation of all directed and insider lending and investment practices;
• Management contracts with time bound and monitorable performance criteria;
• Adequate representation of all stakeholders' interests in supervisory boards;
• Proper checks and balances in internal management, credit allocation, etc.;
• Implementation of management information systems and internal audit.
In light of the growing tide of anti-foreign sentiment and fierce debate about the
"desirable and acceptable" level of foreign participation in the financial sector it seems
impractical and unwise to advise governments that they should sell their largest and
systemically most important financial institutions to foreign strategic investors. Even
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control to foreign professionals at least in the large saving banks and insurance firms no
matter how prudent and reputable the prospective foreign buyers might be. (PKO BP
in Poland, OTP in Hungary are good cases in point.) People might find it also strange
that a kind of an "universal panacea" is being offered to remedy the most if not all
fundamental illnesses of the financial sector. Continental European experience does not
seem to justify this peculiar type of sweeping privatization either; there are quite a few
countries, like Germany, France and Italy, where state – or at least local government –
control  as  well  as  dispersed  ownership  of  domestic  non-financial  institutions  and
individuals have characterized important segments of banking, insurance and capital
markets without substantially deteriorating the quality of governance. Why is it not
possible for Central and Eastern Europe to follow their example?
There are several reasons for that; some of them decisive. First, communism was
too long and too successful in destroying trust in domestic private institutions and
tradition of prudent behavior in economic and social life. Second, when the futile
communist  experience  in  economic  management  was  finally  over,  world  markets
were already characterized by massive cross-border transactions and international
competition was producing new and improved services at a scale never seen before.
Third, the demonstrational impact of liberal capitalism – very much magnified by
modern telecommunication – coupled with the strong desire to catch up with the
most developed world produced an almost insatiable thirst of clients in Central and
Eastern Europe for getting access to the latest and best services without any delay.
The interplay of these and many other factors make it impossible that people finally
free to choose should wait another fifty years before enjoying the same quality of
services as their Western counterparts. But people demanding the best as customers
are unfortunately unable to create them as producers. They themselves demand that
reliable and proven foreign products and services should be clearly available to them
immediately while they may refuse to accept those structures – including those of
foreign governance – which actually create and maintain this high level of quality for
those products and services. (Communist deputies of the Russian parliament indicated
privately that while they cannot accept foreign control in flagship domestic banks, they
would also place their own money mostly in foreign banks domiciled in Russia or
abroad. Nationalism and populism just perpetuate the rule of the oligarchy. ) 
Selling control in financial institutions to foreign strategic partners is the best way to
bridge  the  huge  gap  between  the  very  demanding  and  fully  Westernized  consumer
mentality and the very slowly escapable ignorance of what it takes to be a prudent
provider of the same quality products and services. Since there is no point to resist or
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slow down the influence of consumer capitalism the only way to go is to accelerate the
(re)creation of the culture of confidence and the tradition of prudence inherent in an
efficient, well functioning market economy.
10.2. Competition
• Equal opportunities for entry and exit with maximum transparency;
• Decisive drive against all sectoral and regional market fragmentation;
• Elimination of administrative limits on credits, interest rates and fees;
• Gradual liberalization of cross border transactions and capital flows;
• Simple, reasonable, transparent and equitably enforced rules for taxation;
• Strong culture and regulation of creditors protection in corporate life;
• Strict enforcement of insolvency across the whole spectrum of clients;
• Level playing field in all separate areas of financial intermediation;
• Only temporary fiscal preferences to increase creditworthiness of clients;
• Direct state involvement in building physical and human infrastructure.
Managing transition is an art rather than a science, timing and sequencing are key.
While  fostering  unlimited  domestic  competition  is  indispensable  from  day  one,
international competition could be increased gradually but according to a well established
and  publicly  announced  set  of  operational  criteria.  Countries  preparing  themselves
deliberately for adopting the single market of the EU will be able to catch up more quickly
not  only  in  terms  of  income  and  productivity  but  of  culture  and  tradition  as  well.
Enhancing the creditworthiness of corporate and individual clients by introducing proper
incentives for stimulating financial savings and investment could also multiply the growth
and profit opportunities for financial intermediaries, thus creating a virtuous cycle of trust
and prudence.
Competition, while being a strong incentive and disciplinary force to enhance quality
and increase efficiency, should also be properly managed. Governments should focus on
creating their own single market by eliminating all remaining administrative barriers on
the one hand and helping disadvantaged clients, like SMEs on the other. Transparent,
easily accessible guarantee schemes, one-time grants to cover initial costs, training and
marketing subsidies, infrastructure support make a lot of sense together with the strict
and  even  enforcement  of  regulation  on  bankruptcy,  liquidation,  secured  lending,
foreclosure  of  collateral,  title  transfer,  share  and  company  registration,  minority
protection, taxation, etc. 10.3. Prudential Regulation and Supervision
• Implementation of Basle core principles on banking;
• Even higher capital adequacy and solvency standards;
• Strictest application of rules on portfolio classification;
• But only gradual increase of provisioning requirements;
• Deposit insurance extended only to reputable institutions;
• Independent rating of leading financial intermediary firms;
• Close cooperation or consolidation of supervisory agencies;
• Political and financial independence of supervisory agencies;
• Strong cooperation between host and home country regulators;
• Relentless fight against crime & corruption, cronysm & collusion.
Finally, the weakest point. After ten years of transition there is no one single country
in Central and Eastern Europe where the financial regulatory and supervisory agencies
are really free from – sometimes very open and brutal – political interference and thus
would be able to apply the highest professional standards without compromise. It is less
of  a  problem  in  those  jurisdictions  where  governance  in  and  competition  among
individual financial institutions is strong enough not to leave much to desire in prudent
behavior. Nevertheless, this is still a very dangerous situation because the accelerated
pace of churning out new financial products and services requires constant attention to
market developments, frequent licensing and deep analysis of complex problems with
increasing reliance of discretionary judgements. If the underlying values and mandates
governing  the  behavior  of  management  and  staff  of  these  agencies  are  shaky  or
inconsistent then there is little hope to ensure that public confidence prevail in these
financial markets. Task number one for the next decade is to strengthen considerably the
institutions of prudential regulation and supervision. 
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